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The Senate subcommittee had the following specific findings:
* In 1999, Caterpillar adopted a strategy to use a unit inSwitzerland as the place it recorded most of the profit from itslucrative business selling Caterpillar-branded replacement partsto non-U.S. customers.
* Caterpillar had earlier negotiated with Swiss authoritiesto pay an effective tax rate of only 4 percent to 6 percent onprofits earned in the country.
* Caterpillar had no parts warehouses in Switzerland, but 85percent or more of profits from Caterpillar's parts salesoutside the United States were recorded as coming from the Swissunit, Caterpillar SARL.
* By 2008, Caterpillar had shifted 45 percent of globalrevenues and 43 percent of its profits to the Swiss operation,which employed less than one-half of 1 percent of Caterpillar’s118,500 employees worldwide.
* Caterpillar built a new inventory control system that"served as a second set of inventory books" for Swiss-ownedparts held in the United States. But all the parts wereintermixed, none bore separate ownership labels, and Caterpillaremployees could not distinguish the Swiss-owned parts in anyway.
* PricewaterhouseCoopers was paid $55 million by Caterpillarfor devising the Swiss tax plan. The Senate committee saidPricewaterhouseCoopers "raised significant conflict of interestconcerns" by also serving as Caterpillar’s auditor during thetime in question.
* PricewaterhouseCoopers consultants told Caterpillar thenew system was designed to “migrate profits away from CAT Inc tolow-tax marketing companies. … We are effectively more thandoubling the profit on parts.” * As a result of the plan, Caterpillar experienced “a cashbuildup in Geneva,” a company report showed. By 2002,Caterpillar needed to move as much as $70 million a year back tothe United State's to meet the company's U.S. cash requirements.
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